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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of responding to a count query (or any other integer-valued
queries) evaluated on a dataset containing sensitive attributes. To protect the privacy of individuals in the
dataset, a standard practice is to add continuous noise to the true count. We design a differentially-private
mechanism which adds integer-valued noise allowing the released output to remain integer. As a trade-
off between utility and privacy, we derive privacy parameters ε and δ in terms of the the probability
of releasing an erroneous count under the assumption that the true count is no smaller than half the
support size of the noise. We then numerically demonstrate that our mechanism provides higher privacy
guarantee compared to the discrete Gaussian mechanism that is recently proposed in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conducting nationwide censuses is one of the most important tasks of national or federal agencies
around the world. For example, the 2020 Census in the US is currently under way, which is conducted
by the US Bureau of the Census every ten years [1]. In Australia, census is conducted by the Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) every five years and the next round is due in 2021 [2]. Responding to count
queries about census outcomes is one of the most important tasks of such agencies. This can be important
for distributing national funds, determining optimal voting districts and conducting various scientific or
economic studies of the population. However, this might lead to dire privacy compromises.
In order to protect the privacy of individuals in the census records, the true census results are heavily
guarded. Instead, noisy versions may be released to the public in a one-off general-purpose publication
or privately disclosed to a data analyst in response to specific queries. There is clearly a tension between
releasing an accurate and reliable version of the census outcome and protecting the privacy of individuals
in a population. This tension gets aggravated particularly for underrespresented groups in small towns and
counties. Oftentimes, their livelihoods and future funding depends on them being accurately accounted
for in published census results. At the same, due to being very small in size, they are at the greatest risk
of being re-identified even if perturbed versions of their data is published. For an interesting coverage of
this issue in the 2010 and 2020 US Census rounds, the reader is referred to a recent article published in
the New York Times [3].
Motivated by these applications, in this paper we are interested in formulating and studying optimal
tradeoffs between utility and privacy when a data analyst sends a query to a data curator about the number
of individuals with a common sensitive attribute in a large dataset. Assuming n is the true count, the
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2data curator releases a random variable Y = n+ Z, where Z is an integer-valued noise variable with a
suitably-chosen probability distribution.
It is not surprising that the celebrated differential privacy (DP) framework [4] has been applied to
integer-valued mechanisms for count queries. In fact, DP is a strong candidate for publishing private
2020 US Census outcomes [5]. Other countries such as Australia and New Zealand are closely watching
this space and have already taken steps in evaluating the performance of their existing mechanisms “from
the lens of differential privacy” [6].
A standard approach to preserving ε-DP is to perturb the count query by adding random noise Z with
Laplacian distribution whose variance is proportional to a certain property of the query (i.e., sensitivity).
Adding continuous noise to an integer-valued query makes the output less interpretable. Geometric
distribution, as the discrete counterpart of Laplace distribution, was shown in [7] to be ”optimal” for
integer-valued queries with unit sensitivity. The optimality was defined in terms of minimizing the
expected cost function (chosen from a family of utility functions with some mild regularity conditions)
under a Bayesian framework. Their result, in particular, implies that adding (truncated or folded) geometric
noise to the above-mentioned counting query preserves DP while minimizing the probability of error,
Pr(Z 6= 0). This setting was extended to the mini-max setting in [8] and to queries with general sensitivity
and under the worst case setting in [9]. The design and implementation of geometric distribution on finite-
precision machines were investigated in [10].
More recently, the problem of minimizing the Lp-norm of error of the query output, subject to ε-
DP, was revisited in [11]. It was argued that despite minimizing the probability of error, the geometric
mechanism suffers from a number of limitations. Most importantly, the error p(Y 6= n) depends on the
true count n, leading to uneven accuracy for different queries. In the very high-privacy regime when
ε→ 0, this unevenness in the distribution results in overwhelmingly reporting two extreme values Y = 0
or Y = max n (zero count or maximum possible count in the database). To address this issue, they
proposed an explicit fair mechanism (EM). However, the noise in the EM method adds bias, that is,
E[Y |n] 6= n. Moreover, EM (and also truncated geometric) mechanism does not restrict the support size
of the noise. As such, the output can be any number between the two extremes y = 0 and y = maxn
with non-zero probability.
In a different, and quite recent, line of work, a discrete version of the Gaussian density was considered
for designing privacy-preserving mechanism for count queries. In particular, it was shown in [12] that
adding “discrete” Gaussian noise provides similar privacy and utility guarantees to those obtained by the
well-understood Gaussian mechanism. Discrete Gaussian noise is supported over Z and thus the output of
such mechanism can be all integers regardless of the domain of the query. This might lead to unpleasant
outcomes in some practical scenarios. For example, according to the New York Times article [3], the
population of a county in the 2010 US Census was over-reported by a factor of almost 8 (the true count
was around 90, but was reported to be around 920). While post-processing (truncating or folding the
probability mass function) can be used to limit the range of discrete Gaussian mechanisms, the question
remains whether one can explicitly incorporate a finite support of the noise into the mechanism design
process.
In this paper, we adopt a different approach than [11, 12]. We begin by enforcing three basic desired
constraints on the noise distribution. These properties include zero bias, fixed hard support, and fixed
error probability irrespective of the true count n. By varying the probability of error we can trade off
accuracy with privacy. The hard support for Z ensures that for any given n, the output n+Z takes value
in a pre-specified range with probability one; in particular Y is required to be always non-negative. We
3first design a noise distribution satisfying above constraints and then use it to construct a differentially-
private mechanism (under a mild condition on the dataset). The constraint on the noise support has
two implications. First, the values of the noise added must depend on the true count n (to ensure the
non-negativity of the output). Second, the mechanism provides a slightly relaxed privacy guarantee: it is
ε-DP with probability 1 − δ for some parameter δ > 0. This framework is known as approximate DP
and usually denoted by (ε, δ)-DP [13, 14]. While the proposed noise has similar distribution as discrete
Gaussian (with slightly heavier tail), our numerical findings indicate that the privacy performance of our
mechanism (in terms of ε and δ) is tighter than what would be obtained via discrete Gaussian mechanism
with the same variance.
We can summarize our observations about the interplay of privacy and utility parameters as follows.
As expected, a lower privacy requirement, i.e., higher ε, results in lower δ when the noise support size
and probability of releasing an erroneous value are fixed. By moderately increasing the noise support size
while keeping ε and error probability fixed, we can also significantly improve δ. For example, increasing
the noise support from 2D + 1 = 9 to 2D′ + 1 = 13 we obtain significantly smaller δ. It turns out
that when ε and the noise support size are fixed, reducing the error probability (and hence improving
data reliability) can be tolerated up a certain threshold without significantly affecting δ. However, further
reducing the error probability below such a threshold can have severe effects on the privacy performance
through increasing δ beyond typically acceptable levels.
Notation: For an integer N ∈ N, we use [N ] to denote the set {1, 2, · · · , N}. For a, b ∈ Z and a ≤ b,
we use [a : b] to denote the set {a, a+ 1, · · · , b}.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Suppose a dataset of size at most N is given. A query on the number of entries in the database that
possess a certain sensitive attribute is received by the data curator. Assume n ∈ [N ] is the actual (positive)
count of such attribute. To protect the privacy of individuals in the dataset, the data curator releases a
noisy version of n as
Y = n+ Z, (1)
where Z is an integer-valued noise variable. We assume the noise distribution pZ(·|n) satisfies the
following intuitive properties:
P1. Fix D ∈ N. Noise variable Z takes values in [−A : D], where A .= min{n,D}, i.e., pZ(z|n) = 0
if z /∈ [−A : D]. This properties ensures that the mechanism’s output is always non-negative. A
smaller D implies a smaller noise support set, which in turn implies a larger accuracy in reporting
the query.1
P2. Fix η ∈ (0, 1). The probability of releasing the correct value is set to
pY (Y = n) = η,
irrespective of the true count n. Equivalently, the probability of releasing an erroneous value is
pY (Y 6= n) = 1− η .= η¯.
A larger η means more reliability in releasing the correct value. Conversely, a smaller η means
better privacy in the sense of concealing the true count of the sensitive attribute in the dataset.
1Note that the support of the output for a given n is limited to [n − A : n +D]. For max{1, N −D + 1} ≤ n ≤ N , we
allow the output to be greater than the maximum possible real count N (by at most D). If N  D, this overshoot is negligible.
4P3. In addition, the error must have zero bias. That is, E[Z|n] = 0, which is a statistically desirable
property.2
The following proposition provides a simple family of noise distribution that satisfy these properties.
Proposition 1. Let the true count for a query be n ∈ [N ]. For any i1 ∈ [−A : −1] and i2 ∈ [D], the
following distribution satisfies P1-P3
p
(i1,i2)
Z (z|n) =

η¯ i2i2+|i1| , z = i1,
η, z = 0,
η¯ |i1|i2+|i1| , z = i2,
0, otherwise.
(2)
In light of this proposition, we can obtain that any convex combination of p(i1,i2)Z (z|n), i.e.,
pZ(z|n) .=
−1∑
i1=−A
D∑
i2=1
αi1,i2,n p
(i1,i2)
Z (z|n), (3)
with non-negative coefficients αi1,i2,n satisfying
∑−1
i1=−A
∑D
i2=1
αi1,i2,n = 1, also meets P1-P3. We can
thus use this convex combination to obtain a general data-dependent noise distribution satisfying P1-P3.
The following example makes this construction clear.
Example 1. Let N = 3, η = 12 and D = 2. Note that for n = 1, two distributions are possible for
p
(i1,i2)
Z (z|1) by choosing (i1, i2) = (−1, 1) and (i1, i2) = (−1, 2), as described below
p
(−1,1)
Z (z|1) =

1
4 , z = −1, 1
1
2 , z = 0,
0, otherwise,
and p(−1,2)Z (z|1) =

1
3 , z = −1,
1
2 , z = 0,
1
6 , z = 2,
0, otherwise.
(4)
For n = 2 and n = 3, four distributions are similarly possible by combining i1 = −2,−1 with i2 = 1, 2.
Overall, the general convex structure in (3) produces the noise distributions pZ(·|1), pZ(·|2), and pZ(·|3)
given by
pZ(z|n) =

n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
0 14α−2,2,2 +
1
6α−2,1,2
1
4α−2,2,3 +
1
6α−2,1,3
1
4α−1,1,1 +
1
3α−1,2,1
1
4α−1,1,2 +
1
3α−1,2,2
1
4α−1,1,3 +
1
3α−1,2,3
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
4α−1,1,1
1
4α−1,1,2 +
1
3α−2,1,2
1
4α−1,1,3 +
1
3α−2,1,3
1
6α−1,2,1
1
4α−2,2,2 +
1
6α−1,2,2
1
4α−2,2,3 +
1
6α−1,2,3

. (5)
Each column of this matrix is a valid noise distribution for a given n ∈ [N ], subject to∑−1i1=−A∑Di2=1 αi1,i2,n =
1. Note that row indices range from z = −D to z = D. Also, note that pZ(−2|1) = 0. This is because
for n = 1, we have A = min{n,D} = 1, dictating [−1 : 2] as the support set of p1, instead of [−2 : 2].
2Note that if n = 0, maintaining zero bias is not possible jointly with η < 1 and P1. Hence, we limit ourselves to queries
with n ≥ 1.
5Moreover, pZ(z|n) = 0 for n ≥ 4 or z /∈ [−2 : 2]. By adding such noise to the true count n, the
distribution of Y , given n, becomes
pY (y|n) =

n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
1
4α−1,1,1 +
1
3α−1,2,1
1
4α−2,2,2 +
1
6α−2,1,2 0
1
2
1
4α−1,1,2 +
1
3α−1,2,2
1
4α−2,2,3 +
1
6α−2,1,3
1
4α−1,1,1
1
2
1
4α−1,1,3 +
1
3α−1,2,3
1
6α−1,2,1
1
4α−1,1,2 +
1
3α−2,1,2
1
2
0 14α−2,2,2 +
1
6α−1,2,2
1
4α−1,1,3 +
1
3α−2,1,3
0 0 14α−2,2,3 +
1
6α−1,2,3

, (6)
where the rows range from y = 0 to y = N + D = 5. The value of pY (y|n) for all other values of y
and n not shown above is identical to zero.
A. Incorporating (ε, δ)-DP Conditions
Consider the mechanism Y = n + Z with Z being a data-dependant noise with distribution pZ(·|n)
given in (3). Our objective is to determine the smallest ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that this mechanism is
(ε, δ)-differentially private (DP) [13].
Definition 1. Given ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1), a randomized algorithm M : XN → Y is said to be (ε, δ)-
differentially private (DP) if p(M(x) ∈ S) ≤ eεp(M(x′) ∈ S) + δ for all S ⊂ Y and all neighboring
datasets x, x′ ∈ XN differing in one element.
Below we specialize this standard definition for our count query setup. Given an integer-valued query
q : XN → [N ] about a dataset x, mechanism q randomizes the true query response, say n, via a
data-dependent additive noise process, i.e., q(x) = n + Z. Since the query is integer-valued, we have
|q(x)−q(x′)| ≤ 1 for all pairs of neighboring datasets x and x′. Without loss of generality, in the following
we assume that |q(x)−q(x′)| = 1 for neighboring x and x in the computation of DP parameters. Assuming
q(x) = n, then it implies that we need to verify the DP requirement for dataset x′ for which q(x′) = n+1
or q(x′) = n− 1.
Remark 1. Our approach to computing the DP parameters of mechanism (16) is as follows. We first
consider Definition 1 for the singular events S ⊂ [0 : N +D], i.e., all subsets S satisfying |S| = 1 and
determine the corresponding parameters ε and δ. Clearly, these parameters differ from the DP parameters.
We then convert these parameters to a valid set of DP parameters. In the following, we use ε and δ to
denote the parameters of mechanism (16) when applying Definition 1 for singular events S.
To formulate our goal, we fix ε ≥ 0 and consider the following linear program
δ∗ .= min δ,
s.t. pY (y|n) ≤ eεpY (y|n+ 1) + δ, ∀n ∈ [1 : N − 1], ∀y ∈ [0 : N +D], (7)
pY (y|n) ≤ eεpY (y|n− 1) + δ, ∀n ∈ [2 : N ], ∀y ∈ [0 : N +D]. (8)
Given the mechanism Y = n + Z and Proposition 1, we can explicitly write the optimization of δ in
terms of αi1,i2,n as follows.
6Proposition 2. For given ε ≥ 0, the optimal value δ∗ is the solution of the following linear program
min δ (9)
s.t.∑
i1,i2
αi1,i2,n p
(i1,i2)
Z (y − n|n) ≤ eε
∑
i1,i2
αi1,i2,n+1 p
(i1,i2)
Z (y − n− 1|n+ 1) + δ, ∀n ∈ [1 : N − 1], (10)∑
i1,i2
αi1,i2,n p
(i1,i2)
Z (y − n|n) ≤ eε
∑
i1,i2
αi1,i2,n−1 p
(i1,i2)
Z (y − n+ 1|n− 1) + δ, ∀n ∈ [2 : N ], (11)
αi1,i2,n ≥ 0, ∀i1 ∈ [−A : −1], ∀i2 ∈ [D], ∀n ∈ [1 : N ], (12)
−1∑
i1=−A
D∑
i2=1
αi1,i2,n = 1, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ], (13)
where p(i1,i2)Z (·|n) was defined in (2) and y ∈ [0 : N +D].
Clearly, this above optimization problem is a linear program. If the computational complexity allows, an
explicit expression for δ∗ can be obtained through Fourier-Motzkin elimination of all αi1,i2,n. Nevertheless,
we show in the next section that such expression can be derived directly if we make a minor assumption
on D.
III. EXPLICIT SOLUTIONS FOR n ≥ D
In this section, we show that if the true count satisfies n ≥ D, then δ∗ can be readily derived.
Proposition 3. If noise support parameter D satisfies D ≤ n, then the following data-independent noise
distribution satisfies P1-P3
pZ(z) =

αi
η¯
2 , z = −i, i
η, z = 0,
0, otherwise,
(14)
for all i ∈ [1 : D] and αi ≥ 0 such that
∑D
i=1 αi = 1. In this case,
pY (y|n) =

αi
η¯
2 , y = n− i, n+ i
η, y = n,
0, otherwise.
(15)
Notice that the assumption n ≥ D enables us to design a noise distribution that satisfies P1-P3 while
being independent of the query (i.e., n). The simple mechanism given in Proposition 3 can be represented
by the matrix
7pY (y|n) =

n = D n = D + 1 · · · n = N
αD
η¯
2 0 · · · 0
αD−1 η¯2 αD
η¯
2 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
α1
η¯
2 α2
η¯
2 · · · 0
η α1
η¯
2 · · · αD η¯2
α1
η¯
2 η · · · αD−1 η¯2
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
αD
η¯
2 αD−1
η¯
2 · · · η
0 αD
η¯
2 · · · α1 η¯2
0 0 · · · · · ·
0 0 0 αD
η¯
2

, (16)
where for exposition we have assumed N = 2D. Each column of this matrix represents pY (y|n) for
y ∈ [0 : 3D].
A. Lower bounds on δ∗
To compute δ∗ for mechanism (16), we first derive a lower bound for δ∗ (this subsection) and then
show that it is in fact achievable (next subsection). For notational brevity, define E .= eε. The main tool
for deriving the lower bound is the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For the noise distribution given by Proposition 3, δ∗ satisfies the following inequalities
η¯
2
αD ≤ δ∗, (17)
η¯
2
αi ≤ E η¯
2
αi+1 + δ
∗, i ∈ [1 : D − 1], (18)
η ≤ E η¯
2
α1 + δ
∗. (19)
This proposition follows simply by comparing consecutive columns of the matrix (16). Letting B .= 2η¯
and C .= 2ηη¯ , the system of inequalities given in Proposition 4 can be expressed as
αD ≤ Bδ∗, (20)
αi+1 ≥ αi −Bδ
∗
E
, 1 ≤ i ≤ D − 1, (21)
α1 ≥ C −Bδ
∗
E
. (22)
We now present a series of lower bounds on δ∗ that we term Type-I lower bounds.
Lemma 1. For the noise distribution given by Proposition 3, we have
δ∗ ≥ δk .=
C
∑k−1
j=0 E
j − Ek
B
∑k−1
j=0 E
j(j + 1)
, k ∈ [D]. (23)
Proof. First note that, since α1 ≤ 1, we have from (22),
δ∗ ≥ δ1. (24)
8Since α2 ≤ 1 − α1, a second lower bound is obtained from (21) for i = 2 by eliminating both α2 and
α1 as follows
α1 −Bδ∗
E
≤ α2 ≤ 1− α1 ⇒ α1(1 + E)− E ≤ Bδ∗ (25)
⇒ C −Bδ
∗
E
(1 + E)− E ≤ Bδ∗ ⇒ δ∗ ≥ δ2. (26)
Generalizing this for 1 ≤ k ≤ D, we obtain a general class of lower bounds as follows
αk−1 −Bδ∗
E
≤ αk ≤ 1− α1 − · · ·αk−1 (27)
⇒ αk−1(1 + E) + Eαk−2 + · · ·+ Eα1 − E ≤ Bδ∗ (28)
⇒ αk−2(1 + E + E2) + E2αk−3 + · · ·+ E2α1 − E2 ≤ B(1 + 2E)δ∗. (29)
Iterating this process, we obtain
α1
k−1∑
j=0
Ej − Ek−1 ≤ Bδ∗
k−2∑
j=0
Ej(j + 1) (30)
⇒
(
C −Bδ∗
E
) k−1∑
j=0
Ej − Ek−1 ≤ Bδ∗
k−2∑
j=0
Ej(j + 1), (31)
which upon rearranging implies δ∗ ≥ δk.
In general, none of these lower bounds dominates another. We will shortly elaborate on the relationship
between δk for k ∈ [D]. Before doing so, we first obtain another lower bound for δ∗, termed a Type-II
lower bound.
Lemma 2. For the noise distribution given by Proposition 3, we have
δ∗ ≥ δD+1 .= 1
B
∑D−1
j=0 E
j(D − j) . (32)
Proof. First note that we can write from (17) that αD ≤ Bδ∗. We can extend this inequality for all αi
via (18) as follows
αD−k ≤ Bδ∗
k∑
j=0
Ej , (33)
for k ∈ [0 : D − 1]. Since ∑Di=1 αi = 1, the above inequality implies that
1 =
D−1∑
k=0
αD−k ≤ Bδ∗
D−1∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
Ej = Bδ∗
D−1∑
j=0
D−1∑
k=j
Ej = Bδ∗
D−1∑
j=0
Ej(D − j),
from which the result follows by a arrangement.
Putting lemmas 1 and 2 together, the following theorem is straightforward.
Theorem 1. For the noise distribution given by Proposition 3, we have
δ∗ ≥ δ˜,
where δ˜ , maxk∈[D+1] δk and δk’s were defined in (23) for k ∈ [D] and in (32) for k = D + 1.
9To show that this lower bound is in fact tight, we need to carefully investigate the dynamic of δk’s.
To do so, we define crossover values Ck as
Ck
.
=
∑k
j=0E
j∑k−1
j=0 E
j(k − j) , k ∈ [D]. (34)
For any k ∈ [D], the relational order between two consecutive lower bounds δk and δk+1 is uniquely
determined by the relation of the parameter C .= 2ηη¯ with the crossover value Ck as prescribed in the
following lemma. This, together with strictly decreasing behavior of the sequence {Ck}Dk=1 (to be proved
in Lemma 4) will ensure that we can find the maximum among all δk, k ∈ [D + 1] analytically.
Lemma 3. We have δk ≥ δk+1 for k ∈ [D] if and only if η is such that C .= 2ηη¯ ≥ Ck.
Proof. First consider k = 1 and note that
δ1 − δ2 ≥ 0 ⇔ C − E ≥ C + CE − E
2
1 + 2E
⇔ C ≥ 1 + E = C1. (35)
For k ∈ [2 : D − 1], it follows that δk ≥ δk+1 if and only if
C
∑k−1
j=0 E
j − Ek
B
∑k−1
j=0 E
j(j + 1)
≥ C
∑k
j=0E
j − Ek+1
B
∑k
j=0E
j(j + 1)
.
After a straightforward algebraic manipulation, we can show that it is equivalent to
C ≥
∑k
j=0E
j∑k−1
j=0 E
j(k − j) = Ck.
Last, we have δD ≥ δD+1 if and only if
C
∑D−1
j=0 E
j − ED
B
∑D−1
j=0 E
j(j + 1)
≥ 1
B
∑D−1
j=0 E
j(D − j) ,
which is in turn equivalent to
C
D−1∑
j=0
Ej
D−1∑
j=0
Ej(D − j)
 ≥ ED
D−1∑
j=0
Ej(D − j)
+ D−1∑
j=0
Ej(j + 1)
=
D−1∑
j=0
Ej
 D∑
j=0
Ej
 .
Hence, we conclude δD ≥ δD+1 if and only if
C ≥
∑D−1
j=0 E
j∑D−1
j=0 E
j(D − j) = CD.
Lemma 4. The sequence {Ck}Dk=1 is strictly decreasing.
Proof. This can be easily verified by writing the difference between Ck and Ck+1 and checking that
Ck − Ck+1 =
∑k
j=0E
j(j + 1)
(
∑k−1
j=0 E
j(k − j))(∑kj=0Ej(k + 1− j)) > 0, k ∈ [D]. (36)
10
For notational simplicity, define CD+1
.
= 0 and C0
.
= ∞. Thus, {Ck}D+1k=0 is still monotonically
decreasing. Combining Lemma 3 with Lemma 4, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. For the noise distribution given by Proposition 3, we have
δ˜
.
= max
i∈[D+1]
δi = δk,
if and only if η is such that Ck < C ≤ Ck−1.
Proof. To prove the only-if direction, note that due to strict monotonicity of {Ck}D+1k=0 , C > Ck implies
C > Ck+1 > · · · > CD. Therefore, according to Lemma 3, C > Ck implies δk > δk+1 > δk+2 >
· · · > δD+1. Similarly, C ≤ Ck−1 implies C < Ck−2 < · · · < C1. Therefore, C ≤ Ck−1 implies
δk ≥ δk−1 > δk−2 > · · · > δ1. In summary, Ck < C ≤ Ck−1 implies δ˜ = δk. The forward direction can
be similarly argued.
Together with Theorem 1, this theorem implies that if Ck < C ≤ Ck−1, then
δ∗ ≥ δk.
Next, we design a mechanism for which this lower bound is achieved.
B. Achievability of Lower Bounds
In this section, we show that the lower bound δ˜ = maxi∈[D+1] δi on δ∗ is in fact achievable, i.e., there
exists {αi}Di=1 with αi ≥ 0 and
∑D
i=1 αi = 1 such that the mechanism (16) satisfies the constraints of
the linear program (9) with δ = δ˜.
Definition 2 (Optimal α’s). Set δ˜ = maxi∈[D+1] δi as given in Theorem 1. If η is such that 0 < C ≤ CD,
then δ˜ = δD+1 and we define α∗j ’s as follows
α∗D = Bδ˜ =
1∑D−1
`=0 E
`(D − `) , (37)
α∗j = Eα
∗
j+1 +Bδ˜ =
∑D−j
`=0 E
`∑D−1
`=0 E
`(D − `) , j ∈ [1 : D − 1]. (38)
If η is such that C > CD, then δ˜ = δk for some k ∈ [D]. We then define α∗j ’s for j ∈ [k] as
α∗1 =
C −Bδ˜
E
, α∗j =
α∗j−1 −Bδ˜
E
, j ∈ [2 : k] (39)
and set α∗j = 0 for j ∈ [k + 1 : D].3
Now we are ready for the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. The mechanism (16) with coefficients {α∗i } defined in Definition 2 satisfies the constraints
of the linear program (9) with δ = δ˜, defined in Theorem 1. In particular,
δ∗ = δ˜.
3In the proof of Theorem 3, we will show α∗1 > 0, α∗j ≥ 0 for j ∈ [2 : k] in (39) and that
∑D
j=1 α
∗
j = 1 as desired.
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Proof. First note that once we prove that δ˜ is achievable, Theorem 1 implies that δ∗ = δ˜. Thus, we only
need to prove the achievability of δ˜. Note further that {α∗j} satisfy the inequalities in Proposition 4, with
δ∗ replaced by δ˜, with equality. Therefore, we only need to show that {α∗i } are valid in the sense that
they are non-negative and sum to 1.
Assume C > CD in general and in particular, we have Ck < C ≤ Ck−1, for some k ∈ [D] (recall
that C0 =∞). It follows from Theorem 2 that δ˜ = δk, where δk is a Type-I lower bound given in (23).
First, we note that according to (39)
α∗1 =
C −Bδ˜
E
=
C
∑k−2
`=0 E
`(`+ 1) + Ek−1∑k−1
`=0 E
`(`+ 1)
> 0. (40)
Now consider α∗k in (39). Applying (39) iteratively, we obtain
α∗k =
α∗k−1 −Bδ˜
E
=
C −Bδk
∑k−1
`=0 E
`
Ek
(41)
=
∑k−1
`=0 E
` − C∑k−2`=0 E`(k − 1− `)∑k−1
`=0 E
`(`+ 1)
(42)
≥
∑k−1
`=0 E
` − Ck−1
∑k−2
`=0 E
`(k − 1− `)∑k−1
`=0 E
`(`+ 1)
= 0, (43)
where in the last two steps we have used the fact that C ≤ Ck−1 and the definition of Ck−1 in (34).
Note that the definition of {α∗i } in (39) together with4 δ˜ > 0 implies that α∗i < α∗j for 2 ≤ j < i ≤ D.
In particular, we have α∗k−j > α
∗
k ≥ 0 for j ∈ [k − 1]. Note that
D∑
i=1
α∗i =
k∑
i=1
α∗i =
C
∑k−1
j=0 E
j −Bδk
∑k
j=1 jE
j−1
Ek
= 1, (44)
where we use the fact that α∗j = 0 for j ∈ [k + 1 : D].
Finally, if C ≤ CD then from Theorem 2, we conclude δ∗ = δD+1, which is the Type-II lower bound
on δ∗. In this case, {α∗i } are given in (37) and (38). A similar argument as above shows that 0 ≤ α∗i ≤ 1
for each i ∈ [D] and also ∑i α∗i = 1.
This theorem demonstrates that {α∗i }, defined in Definition 2, constructs the “optimal” mechanism
when plugging into (16) or equivalently the optimal noise distribution when plugging into (14). Fig. 1
shows such optimal noise distribution for ε = 2.18 (E = 8.8463), η = 0.8 (C = 8), and D = 6 for z ≥ 0
(noting the symmetry for z < 0). Note that the minimum true count is assumed to be n ≥ D = 6, which
seems a reasonable assumption in large datasets with hundreds of participants. Using (34), we find that
7.8867 = C3 < C ≤ C2 = 8.1229. Therefore, δ˜ = δ3 = 0.0049 according to Theorem 2. It follows from
(39) that only α∗1, α∗2, and α∗3 are non-zero. Consequently, the noise distribution is in fact supported on
[−3 : 3], instead of what we originally required in P1, i.e., [−6 : 6].
Using Equation (1) in [12], we also plot in Fig. 1, discrete Gaussian distribution, denoted by pG,Z(z),
for z ≥ 0. We set its variance identical to that of our noise distribution, i.e., σ2 = η¯∑Di=1 α∗i i2. It is
worth noting that discrete Gaussian distribution is not compactly supported; however, the probability
that it assigns to points outside [−D : D] is negligible and is not shown in Fig. 1. While the two
distributions may look somewhat similar, they have important differences that substantially impact their
4Note that from (32) we conclude δD+1 > 0. Therefore, δ˜ = maxi δi > 0.
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privacy performance. Notice, for instance, that pG,Z(±1) = 0.11685 and pG,Z(±2) = 0.000416, and
hence pY (n+2|n+1)pY (n+2|n) =
pY (n−1|n)
pY (n−1|n+1) can be as large as about 282. Note that in our proposed distribution,
pZ(±1) = η¯2α∗1 = 0.08987 and pZ(±2) = η¯2α∗2 = 0.00960, and hence pY (n+2|n+1)pY (n+2|n) =
pY (n−1|n)
pY (n−1|n+1) =
α∗1
α∗2
= 0.08987···0.00960··· = 9.3617. Consequently, in the discrete Gaussian mechanism the smallest ε such that
pY (n− 1|n) ≤ eεpY (n− 1|n+ 1) + δ˜ for δ˜ = 0.0049 is ε = 5.6, while for our mechanism ε = 2.18 is
sufficient. This indicates that the optimally-chosen coefficient {αi} in our setting improves the privacy
guarantee of discrete Gaussian mechanism. In the next section, we provide more detailed comparison
between there two mechanisms.
Fig. 1. The noise distribution (14) with {αi} being chosen according to Definition 2 is compared with the discrete Gaussian
noise [12] with the identical variance. Here, we assume for ε = 2.18, η = 0.8, and D = 6. The more ‘graceful‘ transition in
our noise distribution from z = 1 to z = 2 results in an improved privacy performance.
Remark 2. As mentioned in Remark 1, we restricted the definition of differential privacy in Definition 1
to the singular events. As a result, the parameters ε and δ computed in this section do not correspond
to the DP parameters. To compute the relationship between these parameters, recall that the mechanism
(16) is (ε, δ)-DP if for any event S ⊂ [N +D]
pY |n(S) ≤ eεpY |n+1(S) + δ and pY |n(S) ≤ eεpY |n−1(S) + δ,
for all possible query responses n ∈ [N ]. Since pY |n(S) =
∑
y∈S pY |n(y), our analysis in this section
implies that for any S ⊂ [N +D]
pY |n(S)− eεpY |n+1(S) =
∑
y∈S
[
pY |n(y)− eεpY |n+1(y)
]
≤
∑
y∈S∩supp(pY |n)
[
pY |n(y)− eεpY |n+1(y)
]
≤ |S ∩ supp(pY |n)| max
y∈[N+D]
[
pY |n(y)− eεpY |n+1(y)
]
≤ (2D + 1) max
y∈[N+D]
[
pY |n(y)− eεpY |n+1(y)
]
≤ (2D + 1)δ∗,
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where supp(pY |n) denotes the set of y ∈ [N + D] with pY |n(y) > 0 and a closed-form expression for
δ∗ was given in Theorem 3. The same argument shows that pY |n(S) − eεpY |n−1(S) ≤ (2D + 1)δ∗.
This observation indicates that the mechanism (16) is (ε,min{1, (2D+ 1)δ∗})-DP when {αi} is chosen
according to Definition 2.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We begin this section by numerically computing the DP parameters ε and (2D+1)δ∗ of our mechanism
according to Theorem 3.5 In Fig. 2, we assume η = 0.5 and plot the (2D+1)δ∗ in terms of ε for different
values of D. It is clear that (2D+1)δ∗ is no greater than 0.001 for D = 8 and ε > 1.1. It is worth noting
that while we reveal the true count with probability 0.5, from Definition 2, the mechanism’s output lies
in an acceptable range of [n− 3 : n+ 3] with a much higher probability η + η¯(α∗1 + α∗2 + α∗3) = 0.9945
for ε = 1.5.
Fig. 2. DP parameters (2D + 1)δ∗ versus ε for η = 0.5 and different values of D.
In Fig. 3, we illustrate the relationship between the DP parameter (2D+1)δ∗ and η for different values
of ε and D. Quite predictably, for given D and ε, there exists a threshold for η above which (2D+ 1)δ∗
grows fast to one; thus indicating a trade-off between utility (reliability) and privacy. To strike a good
balance between the reliability and privacy, one may choose the the largest value of η just before the
‘knee’ phenomenon occurs. For instance, assuming D = 8, our mechanism provides (1.1, 10−3)-DP and
(2.2, 5×10−7)-DP guarantee while presenting η = 0.5 and η = 0.8, respectively. We remark that ε = 1.1
and ε = 2.2 were numerically chosen such that the knee phenomenon occurs slightly after η = 0.5 and
η = 0.8, respectively.
Next, we compare our mechanism with the recently proposed discrete Gaussian mechanism [12] in
terms of the utility-privacy performance. There may be different ways for conducting such comparison.
To have a fair comparison, we take the following steps:
5We mostly consider practical parameter ranges resulting in (2D + 1)δ∗  1. We thus write (2D + 1)δ∗ instead of
min{1, (2D + 1)δ∗}.
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Fig. 3. DP parameter (2D + 1)δ∗ versus η for ε = 1.1 (left) and ε = 2.2 (right) and different values of D.
1) Given fixed values of η ∈ (0, 1), D ∈ N, and ε ≥ 0, we compute the optimal coefficient {α∗i }
(according to Definition 2) and the corresponding DP parameter (2D+1)δ∗ (according to Theorem
3 and Remark 2). We then compute σ2(η,D, ε) the noise variance given by
σ2(η,D, ε)
.
= η¯
D∑
i=1
α∗i i
2.
2) We generate a discrete Gaussian probability mass function (pmf) according to Equation (1) in [12]
with the variance σ2(η,D, ε). This dictates that the discrete Gaussian mechanism has the same
utility as our mechanism. We refer to the resulting distribution as pG,Z .
3) Let εG and δG be the DP parameters of the discrete Gaussian mechanism. It is proved in [12,
Theorem 7] that
δG = pG,Z
(
Z > εGσ
2 − 0.5)− eεGpG,Z (Z > εGσ2 + 0.5) , (45)
where σ2 is the variance of the discrete Gaussian noise added to the true count. By replacing σ2
by σ2(η,D, ε), we make use of this expression to compare the discrete Gaussian mechanism with
our mechanism in terms of privacy parameters.
As depicted in Fig 4, the (ε, δ)-DP performance of our proposed scheme is superior to that of the
discrete Gaussian mechanism with the same variance for a wide range of privacy parameters (both
mechanisms perform rather poorly for ε < 1.1, resulting in quite high δ). Many other experiments were
conducted and they all showed trends similar to what is shown in Fig. 4.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we explicitly constructed a privacy-preserving mechanism for responding to integer-
valued queries to a dataset containing sensitive attributes. This mechanism is noise-additive but, unlike
many other noise-additive private mechanisms, it adds an integer-valued noise to the true count. The
noise distribution is parameterized by η ∈ (0, 1) which specifies the allowable probability of error in
responding the true count, thereby balancing the privacy-utility trade-off. We proved that this mechanism
is (ε, δ)-differentially private where both ε and δ depend on noise support size and η. This mechanism is
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Fig. 4. Comparison of (ε, δ)-DP performance for η = 0.5 and D = 6 in our proposed mechanism with that of a discrete
Gaussian mechanism with the same variance σ2(η,D, ε). In our mechanism, for a given ε ≥ 0, we compute the optimal
coefficient {α∗i } (according to Definition 2) and the corresponding DP parameter (2D + 1)δ∗ (according to Theorem 3 and
Remark 2). For the discrete Gaussian mechanism, we use (45) to compute δG.
contrasted with the recently proposed discrete Gaussian mechanism [12] which adds discretized Gaussian
noise (with infinite support) to the true count. Our numerical findings indicate that the resulting ε and δ
are tighter than those obtained in discrete Gaussian mechanism for many practical range of η.
We conclude this work with a note on future direction. In this work, we assume that there is a single
query to a dataset. However, in many practical scenarios there are several queries to a single dataset,
each of which might depend on the previous ones. Provided that each query is responded by a our private
mechanism, it is essential to determine how privacy degrades as the number of queries increases. We
believe that the new technique propose in [15] might be helpful for this purpose.
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